What’s in a Plan ? An answer to George Soros’ Plan B to the Eurocrisis. Egmont Commentary, 12 July 2011

The European Union faces important problems in various fields but it seems clear that the really vital issue is the euro. Failing to define and implement a collective foreign policy would negate forty years of efforts in that direction, impairing the capacity to defend Europe’s interests in a globalised world, but it would not tear the Union apart. Reinstating border controls on the free circulation of persons, in violation of the Schengen agreements, would be an obvious absurdity, but the sort of absurdity which can easily be redressed at a later stage. A disorderly break-up of the eurozone, however, would lead to panicky protectionist measures and competitive devaluations, leading in turn to the dismantling of the single market, possibly even the customs union, in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination. That situation could not easily be redressed, and the very existence of the Union would be compromised

Institutional Reform in the EU. European Policy Brief No. 19, February 2014

This Policy Brief discusses the potential reforms of the EU institutions that can take place during the 2014-2019 legislative term. It argues that negotiations on Treaty change are a possibility, but they should only start in the second part of the legislature. In the meantime, several institutional reforms that can improve the functioning of the EU – and hence increase its legitimacy – should already be considered

Beaucoup de présidents en Europe = Many presidents in Europe. Egmont Commentary, 25 June 2009

The three presidents to be elected (President of the Commission, president of the Council and high representative) and an ambiguous treaty of Lisbon, they should live in harmony to avoid a paralysis of the European Institutions says Philippe de Schoutheethe

Making the institutions work better and more effectively together: Priorities for the New Commission. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2014

Philippe de Schoutheete takes as his point of departure in this Commentary the assumption that institutional treaty change cannot be a priority, although he does not exclude that it may become possible and desirable at a later period of economic growth and greater self-confidence in public opinion. In a best-case scenario, he foresees that such a window of opportunity might open towards the end of the present legislature. But in the meantime, he advises concentrating attention on adapting the institutions to make them work better and work more effectively together

On Political Union in Europe: The changing landscape of decisionmaking and political accountability. CEPS Essay No. 4, 21 February 2013

This essay discusses how recent developments have modified the existing allocation of tasks between the EU and national levels and the legitimising mechanisms in decision-making by the EU institutions. It examines in turn the increasing differentiation emerging in member states’ participation in EU policies and institutions, the changing configuration of executive powers and its relationship to the community method, the criteria governing the transfer of economic powers from the member states to the Union and the emerging democratic accountability and legitimising mechanisms before both the European and the national parliaments. Some main implications for the future of European institutions are summarised in the conclusions

The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations. CEPS Special Reports, November 2007

After a long period of internal introspection and deadlock over the Constitutional Treaty, the EU can now see some light at the end of the tunnel. If successfully ratified, the new European Treaty agreed by the Head of States and Government in Lisbon may provide the appropriate institutional tools for the EU to function with 27 member states. However, the success of institutional innovations depends not only on legal provisions, but also on the way in which the provisions are implemented. Indeed, even a cursory examination indicates that the implementation of the new proposals is unlikely to be easy, and in some cases could be a source of serious difficulties in the future. In the absence of serious analysis aimed at this latter question, three Brussels-based think-tanks have joined forces in a collaborative effort to fill this gap. Our aim is to highlight potential problems and, where possible, to suggest ways to avoid or attenuate their negative effects. The analysis has focused on seven main institutional and policy domains: the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Presidency of the Council, the qualified majority voting in the Council, the role of national Parliaments, enhanced cooperation and foreign policy. These issues have been intensively debated in working groups composed of researchers, external experts, and practitioners in the field. This report reflects the substance of that collective effort

The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations

This book examines the institutional innovations that are gradually being introduced as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon

Priorities for the Juncker Commission: Policy recommendations and advice from the research team at CEPS. CEPS Special Report No. 92, 22 October 2014

In the months leading up to his nomination as President of the European Commission by the European Council in June 2014 through to his approval by the European Parliament in mid-July and finally his approval at a second special summit in August, CEPS’ researchers have closely followed the travails of Jean-Claude Juncker. We have also carefully studied his fundamental restructuring of the College in re-grouping commissioners around seven project teams, each headed by a vice-president. In our view, these changes promise to improve internal coordination, policy-making and transparency of rule-making and hopefully will reduce the personalisation of portfolios. This Special Report brings together under a single cover a series of 14 separate commentaries prepared by senior CEPS researchers, offering their assessment of these profound changes underway and their policy advice to the new commissioners from the perspective of their field of specialisation

The Evolution of Intergovernmental Cooperation in the European process. Egmont European Affairs Publication, 2006

The Luxemburg report, also known as the Davignon report, adopted by Foreign Ministers in October 1970 is a generally accepted departure point for intergovernmental cooperation among members of the European Community. It was the first time that the “Community method”, devised by Jean Monnet and consolidated by the treaty of Rome on the basis of texts prepared by the Spaak Committee, was deliberately discarded, in the field of foreign policy, in favour of the traditional methods of diplomatic consultation, in an exercise initially known as “political cooperation”. The significance of that initial step can only be understood by a flashback to the failure of the Fouchet negotiations in the spring of 1962. That negotiation, launched and largely dominated by General de Gaulle, had been understood by his partners as a deliberate attempt to subordinate the nascent European Community to an intergovernmental construction established in Paris, presumably dominated by France, and without any of the supranational procedures or institutions which had made Monnet’s proposals acceptable to the smaller countries. Its final failure was immediately perceived as a turning point, as a clear parting of the ways between the Gaullist concept of l’Europe des patries and the supranational concept developed in the fifties. It was moreover quite acrimonious: participants accusing each other of arrogant and irresponsible behaviour. In his memoirs Paul-Henri Spaak, who played a prominent role both as Belgian Foreign Minister and as foster father of the treaty of Rome, clearly puts the responsibility on the shoulders of Couve de Murville. Years later, in a reflective mood, he asked himself, in my presence, whether he had not, at the time, been too intransigent. Whatever the merits of the case, the exercise left all parties with the sour taste of an important failure

Scenarios for escaping the constitutional impasse. Egmont European Affairs Publication, Summer 2006

The European Union’s constitutional treaty remains central to whatever realistic scenario one might imagine, argues Philippe de Schoutheete, who was for many years the doyen of the EU diplomatic corps in Brussels. He assesses the options now open to policymakers